Aristotle and the Problem of Universal Accessibility in Leisure
Articles
Lianchong Deng
Zhejiang University image/svg+xml
https://orcid.org/0009-0000-8700-2196
Published 2024-10-23
https://doi.org/10.15388/Problemos.2024.106.2
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Keywords

Aristotle
Leisure
Soul
Moral psychology

How to Cite

Deng, L. (2024) “Aristotle and the Problem of Universal Accessibility in Leisure”, Problemos, 106, pp. 22–35. doi:10.15388/Problemos.2024.106.2.

Abstract

Leisure is both a necessary precondition for, and the ultimate purpose of, human activities. As such, it is commonly understood as a state of contemplation practiced for its own sake. However, this view raises a problem regarding its universal accessibility. Aristotle’s ethical and political theories demand leisure as a universally embraced way of life, while contemplative leisure appears impractical for common people. There are broadly two approaches to fix this problem: (a) distinguishing leisure of two sorts, and (b) expanding the semantic scope of contemplation. Nevertheless, they both come with certain limitations. I propose redefining leisure as a moral-psychological concept aligned with the allegedly hexis-state of the soul. This redefinition presents leisure as a basic human condition, offering a possible solution to the problem of its universal accessibility.

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